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CASE COMMENTS

special expertise to deal "with the major concerns of the shipping
industry-with all of them, and not just with a few of them selected
on antiquarian criteria." 72 Thus the test for admiralty jurisdiction
in all matters should be whether the subject is one of the "major
concerns" of the maritime industry. Such a test and purpose for
admiralty would arm it with
the responsibility ... jurisdiction and remedial power needed
to keep watch over the concerns of the shipping industry in their
commercial and property aspects. It would be a sort of oneindustry Tribunal of Commerce. As such it would be in a position
to give vigorous articulation to the federal interest in shipping,
and at the same time would implement a valuable experiment in
the use of the industrial court.7 3
RONALD

J. BACIGAL

CLAYTON ACT TOLLING PROVISIONA NEW INTERPRETATION
Section 5 of the Clayton Act, which was included to encourage the
private litigant to seek recovery for antitrust violations, in addition to
the treble measure of damages provided for in the preceding section
of the Act, 2 provides:
(a) A final judgment or decree . . . rendered in any civil or
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United
States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has
present system. In 1960, 5655 admiralty actions constituting 94% of all
admiralty actions in the United States were distributed among 19 admiralty
districts, the top 6 of which had the following admiralty caseloads: SD.N.Y,
2294; ED. La., 869; ED. Pa., 485; S.D. Tex., 361; ND. Cal., 261; E.D. Va.,
229. Fiddler, The Admiralty Practice in Montana and All That. 17 Me. L. Rev. 15,
17 (1965).
72
Gilmore & Black, supra note 36, at 27.
73Black, supranote 44, at 276-77.
the offense is committed on the high seas.' Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of
1
"Section 5 . . . was passed in response to the plea of President Wilson. In a
speech to the Congress on January 20, 1914, he urged that a law be enacted
which would permit victims of antitrust violations to have 'redress upon the
facts and judgments proved and entered in suits by the Government' and that
'the statute of limitations ... be suffered to run against such litigants only
from the date of the conclusion of the Government's action." Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 US. 311, 318
(1965).
2
Clayton Act 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914), I5 U.S.C. S 15
(1914).
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violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other
party against such defendant under ... [§ 4 of the Clayton Act]
as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would
be an estoppel as between the parties thereto ....
(b) Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the
United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any
of the antitrust laws ...

the running of the statute of limitations

in respect of every private right of action arising under said
laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of
in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof
and for one year thereafter. .... 3

This section affords 2 advantages to the private litigants: "It
may help them with any limitations problems they have," and "it also
helps them with their proof by giving them permission to use the
government action as evidence." 4
Section 5 (b) (hereafter referred to as the tolling provision) has been
judicially interpreted as being related to and dependent on § 5(a)
(hereafter referred to as the prima facie evidence provision) for its
meaning. As a result, the collateral estoppel language of the prima
facie evidence provision has been held to apply to the requirement of
the tolling provision that the private suit be "based in whole or in
part on any matter complained of" in the Government suit. This
means that private litigants have found it necessary to show perfect
identity between the private and Government suits to bring the tolling
provision into play, thereby depriving private antitrust litigants of
many possible advantages of the tolling provision.
Eynich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,5 decided in 1951, is
generally recognized" as stating the scope and purpose of the prima
3
Clayton Act, supra note 2, § 16 as amended 69 Stat. 283 (1955) 15 U.S.C.
S 16 (1955).
4
Simon, The Private Litigant and Prior Government Judgments or Decrees,
7 Antitrust Bull. 27 (1962).
-340 U.S. 558 (1951).
0
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311, 317 (1965); Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S.
89, 102 (1954); Buckhead Theatre Co. v. Atlanta Enterprises, Inc., 327 F.2d 365,
367 (5th Cir. 1964); New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 357 (3d Cir. 1964); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.
v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 225 (9th Cir. 1964); International Shoe Mach. Corp.
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 315 F.2d 449, 454 (1st Cit. 1963); Hyslop v. United
States, 261 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cit. 1958); Eagle Lion Studios, Inc. v. Loew's,
Inc., 248 F.2d 438, 444 (2d Cit. 1957); Loew's, Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, Inc.,
210 F.2d 86, 90 (10th Cir. 1954); Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
213 F.2d 284, 290 (7th Cir. 1954).
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facie evidence provision. That provision must be analyzed before any
interpretation of the tolling provision can be attempted.
Emich held that the prima facie evidence provision makes available
to the private litigant only those "matters previously established by
the Government in antitrust actions." 7 The Supreme Court stated that
"Congress intended to confer, subject only to a defendant's enjoyment
of its day in court against a new party, as large an advantage as the
estoppel doctrine would afford had the Government brought suit." 8
It was further held that the collateral estoppel doctrine must be referred to in order to determine the evidentiary use which may be made
of prior judgments or decrees.0 This means that "final judgments or
decrees ... are admissible under § 5 of the Clayton Act as prima facie
evidence only of issues actually determined in the prior adjudication
... )510 The prima facie evidence provision, then, focuses "on the
narrow issue of the use by private parties of judgments or decrees as
prima facie evidence." "
In Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp. 12 the Supreme Court
established the principles to be followed in applying the tolling provision, holding that the prima facie evidence and tolling provisions are
to be read together. This means that the identity necessary between the
private action and the Government action must be perfect in order
to satisfy the requirement in the tolling provision that the private
suit be "based in whole or in part on any matter complained of" in
the Government suit. Thus, as the Court puts it, "the same means must
be used to achieve the same objectives of the same conspiracies by
the same defendants" 13 to make the tolling provision operative.
The Steiner interpretation is based on the argument that (1) the
legislative history of § 5 supports the interpretation of the words "any
matter complained of" to mean the exact acts of the defendant complained of by the Government, not just the same conspiracy; 14 (2)
private civil antitrust actions are not founded upon the conspiracy
itself, but upon the overt injury-causing acts done in furtherance of
7

Emich Motor Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra note 5, at 568.

slbid.
9Ibid.

1OPartnar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89, 102 (1954),
citing Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra note 5.
"lMinnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311, 317 (1965).
12232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956).
131d. at 196.

141bid.
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the conspiracy; 15 thus (3) the tolling provision cannot be extended to
matters (acts) which might have been but were not complained of by

the United, States."'
Thus under Steiner, claims which the private litigant cannot establish
as perfectly identical to those complained of by the Government must
be brought within the statute of limitations. If there are also perfectly identical claims, they would fall under the tolling provision, thus
leaving 2 different limitation periods governing the same lawsuit, a
classic trap for the unknowing.
Application of the collateral estoppel rules to the tolling provision,
thus requiring perfect identity between the Government and private
claims, would be logical if Congress had intended the scope of the
tolling provision to be as limited as the scope of the prima facie evidence provision.' 7 The courts accepted this assumption of identical
scope until it was questioned in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Nisley' s decided by the 10th Circuit in 1961. Prior to Union Carbide,
the problem had seldom arisen as to what constituted the necessary
identity between the matters complained of in the private and the
151hid. It is interesting to note here that the Circuit Court in Leh, infra note
20, although following Steiner, supra note 12, said that the 9th Circuit had
gone further than other circuits, by holding that the words "any matter
complained of" referred to overt acts of the defendants in the Government
proceeding and not just the conspiracy behind those acts. Leh v. General
Petroleum Corp., 330 F.2d 288, 301 n.15 (9th Cir. 1964). One commentator expressed a concern whether Steiner meant that virtually identical overt acts
had to be alleged. Wiprud, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits Against Electrical
Manufacturers: The Statute of Limitations and Other Hurdles, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev.
29, 45 (1962). A 1964 Ninth Circuit decision, Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 219 (9th Cir. 1964), held that "the tolling
statute does not require, and the Steiner test does not provide, that all matters
complained of in the private action must find a counterpart in the Government
action." While this holding appears to weaken the Steiner test, it is significant
that before making the -above statement the court in Goldwyn went to some
length to point out that there were, in fact, the same means, objectives, defendants, and conspiracies alleged in both actions. Id. at 217-19.
'6Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., supra note 12.
17In addition to Steiner, support for this proposition can be found in the
following: Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.
1954); Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948);
United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 172 F. Supp. 580, 586 (D. Conn. 1959);
Cardinal Films, Inc. v. Republic Pictures Corp., 148 F. Supp. 156, 159 (S.D.N.Y.
1957). See also Court DeGraw Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 198,
200 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Rubenstein, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 154 F. Supp.
216, 218 (D. Minn. 1957); Schreiber v. Loew's Inc., 147 F. Supp. 319, 323
(WD. Mich. 1957); Levy v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 787, 789
(ND. Cal. 1952).
18300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961).
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Government suits to make the tolling provision operative. 19 The
courts had merely compared the 2 complaints to determine whether
the matters complained of by the private litigant were matters as to
which a judgment or decree in the Government suit would be an
estoppel as between the parties in the Government suit.
The result reached in 1964 by the 9th Circuit in Leh v. General
Petroleum Corp.20 created a conflict between this and the 10th Circuit

decision in Union Carbide. To resolve this conflict the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine the degree of identity necessary to
satisfy the tolling provision requirement that the private suit be based
"in whole or in part on any matter complained of" in the Government
suit.2 1 Leb involved a private treble damage action against 7 companies engaged in producing, refining, and marketing gasoline and
other hydrocarbon substances in interstate commerce. The defendants
were charged with violating § § 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act22 by

conspiring to restrain and to monopolize the wholesale and retail dis-

tribution of refined gasoline throughout Southern California. The
restraint was allegedly accomplished by excluding independent jobbers
from distribution and by eliminating such jobbers' retail outlets,
thereby preventing them from competing with the retail outlets
owned and operated by defendants. Although a problem arose as to
2
which of 2 statutes of limitations was applicable to the action,
the plaintiffs were not concerned with that aspect of the case, but con-

tended that any applicable statute of limitations was suspended under
the tolling provision of the Clayton Act because a 1950 United States
19 "Controversy raised by the limitations portion of Section 5 has dealt mainly
with the question of during what period of time the government action was
pending and when did it cease to pend." Simon, supra note 4, at 28. A typical
statement of the applicable rule regarding pendency is found in Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1953): "It is clear
...
that antitrust suits should be considered 'pending' until the entry of a
judgment or decree which finally disposes of all the allegations of antitrust
violations." See generally WViprud, supra note 15, at 43-44.
20330 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1964).
2
Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965).
226 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1955).
23
The defendants argued that plaintiffs' action was barred by the California
1-year statute of limitations applicable to suits for statutory penalties. Plaintiffs
contended that the governing provision was the 3-year statute respecting suits
for a statutory liability other than a penalty. The plaintiffs conceded that the
4-year limitations period added to the Clayton Act in 1955, supra note 3, was
not applicable to their cause of action accruing in 1954.
On this matter, the 9th Circuit held that a private treble damage action
was of a penal rather than remedial nature and therefore, the applicable provision was the 1-year statute. For a discussion concerning this aspect of -Leb,
see 40 Wash. L. Rev. 222 (1966).

358

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIII

antitrust proceeding arising from the same conspiracy was still pending at the time the plaintiffs filed their complaint.
24
The 9th Circuit, in affirming the decision of the District Court,
upheld the defendant's statute of limitations defense by interpreting the
tolling provision in the light of Steiner, thus requiring perfect identity
between the Government and private suits to make the tolling provision operative. The Court said the 2 claims lacked perfect identity
because:
1) The dates of the conspiracies differed-the Government
alleging a conspiracy running from 1936 until 1950 and plaintiffs
alleging a conspiracy from 1948 until 1951.
2) The defendants were not the same in both actions-Shell Oil
Co. and the Conservation Committee of California Oil Producers
being joined in the Government suit, but not in the private suit,
and the Olympic Refining Co., though later dropped, being
originally joined by the private claimants but not by the Government.
3) The conspiracies differed-the Government charging that
the defendants had conspired to eliminate the competition of independent marketers, and plaintiffs charging a conspiracy to eliminate independent jobbers and retailers.
4) The areas of the conspiracies differed-plaintiffs alleging
a conspiracy involving Southern California, which was only a
part of the Pacific States area with which the Government was
concerned.
In reversing the 9th Circuit the Supreme Court relied primarily upon
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,25
decided between the granting of certiorari and oral argument in Leh.
New Jersey Wood Finishingestablished certain basic principles for the
interpretation of the tolling provision and swept away much of the
foundation for the perfect identity required in Steiner. The Court
held that the prima facie evidence provision and the tolling provision
are not necessarily coextensive, being governed by different considerations as well as different Congressional policy objectives, thus making
the 2 provisions readily severable. 26 Leh, in following up and
establishing the new approach to be taken to these 2 sections, held
that "substantial identity" - of subject matter in the 2 suits is all
24Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 208 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Cal. 1962), aff'd,
330 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1964).
2381 U.S. 311 (1965).
231d.at 318.
2

7Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., supra note 21, at 63.
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that is required to make the tolling provision operative, applying
the same test used earlier by the 10th Circuit in Union Carbide.
As to the tolling provision itself, "the textual distinctions as well
as to the policy basis of. . . [the tolling provision] indicate that it was
to serve a more comprehensive function in the congressional scheme of
things" 28 than that allowed by the perfect identity interpretation. The
purpose in adopting the tolling provision was not as limited as that
behind the prima facie evidence provision, because when enacting
the tolling provision Congress "was not then dealing with the delicate
area in which a judgment secured in an action between two parties
may be used by a third" and because it was plain that with the tolling
provision "Congress meant to assist private litigants in utilizing any
benefits they might cull from government antitrust actions." 29 Thus,
the tolling provision can operate to make available to the private litigant the Government's earlier pleadings, transcripts of testimony, and
exhibits, all of which are potentially of great value in the investigation
of this case. Moreover, involved and difficult legal questions may be
resolved to the private litigant's advantage before he initiates proceedings. These are reasonably expectable advantages of the tolling
provision if the "more comprehensive function" envisaged by CongressO0 for that provision is to have any meaning. New Jersey Wood
Finishing went so far as to say that it was of crucial significance that
the potential advantages available to litigants because of the tolling provision reach far beyond the specific and limited benefits accruing to
them under the prima facie evidence provision.3 '
28

Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra
note 11, at 319.
291d. at 317.
30
The Supreme Court admitted that there is almost a complete absence of
Congressional discussion on the extent of the coverage of the tolling provision. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra
note 11, at 320. The Court referred, however, to its decision in Burnett v. New
York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), an FELA case, where the question involved
effecting Congressional purpose by tolling the statute of limitations in given circumstances. Burnett said that to determine that intent "the purposes and policies
underlying the limitation provision, the Act itself, and the remedial scheme
developed for the enforcement of the rights given by the Act" must be
examined. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R, supra at 427. Since the whole idea of the
Clayton Act was "intended to help persons of small means who are injured in
their property or business by combinations or corporations violating the antitrust
laws," H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong, 2d Sess. 14 (1914), it is logical that Congress meant to offer the private litigants as many advantages as a reasonable
interpretation
of the tolling provision allows.
3
1Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra
note 11, at 320.
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Two major textual distinctions between the tolling and prima facie
evidence provisions lend further support to the conclusion that they
are not dependent upon each other for their application: (1) A
"final judgment or decree" is a condition precedent to the application
of the prima facie evidence provision. However, the tolling provision suspends the statute of limitations from the time the Government institutes suit regardless of whether a final judgment or decree is
ultimately entered. (2) The applicability of the tolling provision in
no way turns on the success of the Government's case, while the
prima facie evidence provision turns on raising an estoppel against the
unsuccessful defendant in the Government suit through use of the proGovernment judgment or decree.
It is clear, then, that the tolling provision is not-and should not
be-limited in its applicability to the rules of collateral estoppel which
govern the prima facie evidence provision. However, a question remains: the decree of identity required between the private and Government suits to permit the private litigant the benefits of the tolling
provision.
The "substantial identity of subject matter" test, originally established by the 10th Circuit in Union Carbide and now accepted by the
Supreme Court in Leh, will cause some difficulty because of the
vagueness of the phrase "substantial identity." The Supreme Court
did warn that "care must be exercised to insure . . . that the matters
complained of . . .bear a real relation to the private plaintiff's claim

for relief." 82 The Court continued, however, that "the courts must
not allow a legitimate concern that invocation of. . .[the tolling provision] be made in good faith to lead them into a niggardly construction of the statutory language ... 33 Thus the Court has indicated
that its desire to give the private litigant the advantages of this tolling
provision greatly outweighs the increased difficulty in determining
what are "matters complained of" in both private and Government
suits.
"

3 2Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., supra note 21, at 59.
33lbid. Union Carbide points out the ultimate inequity of the collateral estoppel
approach to the tolling provision:
If we accept the . . . [collateral estoppel] interpretation of . . . [the tolling

provision], a Section 4 [treble damage action provision] plaintiff would be put
to the necessity of bringing suit on the same conspiracy alleged in the
government suit, or suffer the bar of the statute as to every overt act not complained of in the government suit. This interpretation would lead to a
multiplicity of suits with duplication of proof. It would add to the burdens
of the private suitor to the harassment of the defendants.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, supra note 18, at 570.
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Yet some guideline is necessary to the application of the tolling
provision. Leh establishes that in applying the "substantial identity"
test "effect must be given to the broad terms of the statute itself-'based
in 'whole or in part on any matter complained of.' " 34Thus the private
plaintiff need not allege that the identical defendants used the identical
means to achieve the identical objectives of the identical conspiracies.
As to identity of parties, the Court explained why absence of complete identity of defendants is unrelated to whether the private
claimantes suit is based on matters of which the Government complained:
In the interim between the filing of the two actions it may have
become apparent that a party named as a defendant by the Government was in fact not a party to the antitrust violation alleged.
Or the private plaintiff may prefer to limit his suit to the defendants named by the Government whose activities contributed most
directly to the injury of which he complains. On the other hand,
some of the conspirators whose activities injured the private
claimant may have been too low in the conspiracy to be selected
as named defendants or co-conspirators in the Government's
necessarily broader net.3 5
The disparity in time periods is equally insignificant:
That plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy corresponding in time to the
period during which they were in business obviously does not
mean that this conspiracy is not based in part on matters complained of by the Government. 6
Also, differences in the scope and effect of the conspiracies have
likewise no effect on the operation of the tolling provision.
Leh, therefore, significantly changes the degree of identity required
in the private and Government suits. The statute of limitations can
now be suspended even against those defendants not named by the
Government. Of course, it is still necessary that the matters complained of in the private suit against that defendant be in some way a
part of the conspiracy alleged by the Government. However, if the
private plaintiff can show that a particular defendant was involved
in the larger conspiracy alleged by the Government, even so remotely
as to be unnamed as a defendant in the Government suit, he may
take advantage of the tolling provision against that defendant and
34

Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., supra note 21, at 59.

33M. at 64.
"GIbid.
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prove the particular effect of that defendant's localized conspiracy
37
on him as private plaintiff.
Leh is authority for this proposition, but one should note that the
1 defendant named by the private plaintiff and not by the Government was dismissed from the case prior to the ruling on the statute of
limitations defense. The Court's statement that some conspirators'
activities "may have been too low in the conspiracy to be selected
as named defendants . . . in the Government's necessarily broader
nee, a8 indicates that absence of complete identity of defendants is
unrelated to whether the private suit is based on "matters complained
of" by the Government and indicates that courts should no longer
hesitate to apply the tolling provision to even those defendants not
named in the Government suit.
The Leh interpretation of the tolling provision is certainly the proper
one and makes the provision one of the most effective devices
available to private antitrust litigants. This approach to the tolling
provision by the Supreme Court now fits the intent of Congress to
afford the private litigant as many advantages as possible in its scheme
to provide impetus to the whole field of antitrust litigation.
One may question the propriety of tolling the statute of limitations
at all during the pendency of Government proceedings. Doing so
seems to avoid the whole policy behind statutes of limitations,30 since
the private plaintiff working under the advantages of the tolling provision is not required to pursue his cause of action until 1 year
after the Government action has ended. Consequently, defendants may
37Since the statute of limitations against private antitrust actions is tolled by
the institution of any civil or criminal proceeding by the United States, the private litigant is spared certain problems. Normally, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4,
a plaintiff is required to serve process within a reasonable time after the
complaint has been filed. This would mean that, as to private antitrust litigants,
the suit would probably come to trial before the Government proceeding had
ended and the private litigant would not have the intended benefits of that
Government action. With the tolling provision, however, the private litigant
does not even have to file his complaint until 1 year after the Government
suit has ended. Therefore, there will be no problem of the suit in trial before
the private litigant desires. Of course, even this situation could be handled
by obtaining a continuance when the suit did reach trial.
38
• Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., supra note 21, at 64.
39Such statutes "promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival
of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memoties have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one
has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within
the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time
comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).

